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ABSTRACT
Scholars have succeeded in producing several explanations for why groups choose to pursue
their policymaking goals in different venues. A synthetic framework that explains the choices
these groups make is developed through two case studies describing a conflict over the
environmental problem of agricultural field burning. Emergent, boundedly rational, groups with
a mission to clear the air of the pollutants associated with field burning, are found to be choosing
venues by strategically assessing the institutional context. The particular institutional context that
matters involves three primary elements: the group’s mix of resources, opponents’ resource
strengths, and the degree of venue accessibility. These initial choices allow groups to generate
new resources, to learn about which strategies do and do not work, and to change venues on the
basis of their new resources and what they have learned.
Keywords: Venue Choice, Field Burning, Policy Change, Adaptive Venue Shopping, adaptive
learning, collaboration
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Introduction
The world of environmental politics and policy is no stranger to policy conflict driven by
political interests representing changing societal values and practices at odds with the legal status
quo (Brick and Cawley 2008). Many of these policy battles are resolved locally, but the high
stakes environmental problems that groups and policymakers are struggling over are increasingly
taking on global dimensions (Rootes 2013). It has become common for environmental advocacy
groups seeking change, especially newly formed groups, to encounter major resistance from
entrenched interests benefiting from, and using their resources to, prevent change. This means
that nascent groups, often lacking large and politically mobilized constituencies, are outgunned
both financially and in their application of legal and/or scientific expertise in policymaking
venues, ‘the institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given
issue’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, p. 32). One consequence is that the policymaking venues
available to them, such as legislatures, courts, administrative agencies and, increasingly,
collaborative institutions (see Lubell, Henry and McCoy 2010), remain dominated by established
interests who successfully resist change. How do groups navigate this difficult policy terrain
when their adversaries have come to dominate the policymaking venues that make policy change
possible?
Scholars have not overcome the challenge of providing a sufficient answer to this
question despite its practical and theoretical importance to all groups that are seeking policy
change. In order to bring greater clarity to this question, we explore how newly formed groups
place demands on various institutional venues during a major, ongoing controversy over the
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practice of agricultural field burning in the U.S. states of Washington and Idaho. Employing a
multiple case study approach, we ask, ‘how might a nascent environmental group, or any group
for that matter, navigate a political system marked by multiple policy venues in their quest for
change?’ Interestingly, we find that the newly formed environmental and public health interest
groups in each case chose to pursue the very same policy goals – clean air – in different policy
venues. Why?
Through personal interviews with key participants and archival research, we identify
three factors that prove critical for improving our understanding of the complex process of venue
choice: the behavior of newly emerged groups; the institutional context in which they make
decisions about choosing venues; and the role that learning plays in choosing strategies for
pursuing their primary policy goals. Our framework builds on the insights of the Ecology of
Games Framework developed by Lubell (2013); it assumes the existence of multiple venues at
various levels of the American system. Our core theoretical argument, and synthetic framework,
the Adaptive Venue Shopping (AVS) Framework, is grounded in the idea that newly emerged
groups base their strategic choices about where to pursue their policy goals by assessing the
institutional context in which they are embedded. This process, driven by the trial-and-error
decision-making typical of boundedly rational groups, entails an important degree of adaptive
learning about which strategies do and do not work. The products of this adaptive learning
process are deliberate changes in strategy that lead to venue change (see Heikkila and Gerlak
2013). Further, as adaptive learning occurs, groups begin generating and assembling resources
that can be transferred from one institutional venue to another, thus improving their prospects for
successfully altering the policy status quo.
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Before exploring and developing the empirical evidence in the two cases of field burning,
we provide a full discussion of the AVS Framework, along with the research methods employed
for this study. After laying out our theoretical argument in more detail, we describe the
institutional context that shapes the decisions that are made by emergent environmental groups,
the methodology for our multiple case study design, and our findings.
Emergent groups, institutional context, and adaptive venue shopping
A number of theories have traditionally been used to better understand the process of venue
shopping in the American political system. First, instrumental rational choice theories grounded
in bounded rationality (e.g., cognitive limitations, imperfect information) argue that ‘coalitions
will seek to utilize their resources efficiently [and strategically]…to produce the most policy
benefits for the cost incurred’ when pursuing policy change in the context of multiple
intergovernmental venues (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 142, Weible 2007, Weible and
Sabatier 2007). Second, Lubell et al. (2010) accept these same behavioral assumptions and
develop the ecology of (policy) games involving multiple policy venues. In the ecology of
games, actors prefer particular venues and thus ‘spend energy developing [their skills and
resources] in the new venue and move away from other [possible] games [or venues]’ (Lubell et
al. 2010, p. 290). This approach challenges the analytical tradition of focusing on one policy
venue at a time, and emphasizes how adaptive policy systems furnish policies that are the
product of multiple decisions being made in multiple venues over long periods of time (Lubell
2013).
Pralle (2003), on the other hand, places primary emphasis on structural barriers and the
cultural and ideological pre-dispositions of group leaders. Taken together, she argues that groups
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develop preferences for certain venues, meaning that potential opportunities in other venues are
often missed because groups will not strategically change course (Pralle 2003, p. 242).
Finally, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) emphasize the critical interplay between image
framing and a venue’s image receptivity—the idea of an amiable venue. Successful political
actors can either manipulate images to favor their preferred venue, or react to a changing image
by altering their choice of venue. The problem with this second choice, however, is that the
actor’s ability to influence policy outcomes may diminish since there is no guarantee that the
new venue will be favorable to their interests.
These theories are all useful in their own way, but also limited in their efficacy given the
complex empirical realities of venue shopping that are demonstrated in our cases. Instead, the
evidence from our case studies supports a synthetic adaptive learning framework in which
several of the elements in existing venue choice theories are evident, yet not individually capable
of explaining the choices made in our cases. Our AVS Framework describes how emergent
groups with a mission, in this case, to clear the air of the pollutants associated with field burning,
are choosing venues using a strategic calculation, or assessment, based on the institutional
context where multiple policy games are playing out. Of central importance is the discovery that
during the years-long environmental battles we analyze, emergent groups willingly adapted when
their initial strategic choices fell short and applied what they learned to new venue choices where
the goal of policy change later became fulfilled.
When emergent environmental groups are choosing venues, three important elements
shape the institutional context: the group’s mix of political, legal and technical resources;
opponents’ resource strengths; and the degree of venue accessibility, which is a combination of
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opponents’ degree of control over a venue and a venue’s image amiability or receptivity (see
Table 1).
The Institutional Context
Group resources
Groups and alliances participating in the policymaking process have access to three main types
of resources that they utilize in their quest for their preferred policy outcomes. The three forms
of resources are political, legal, and technical. Groups can develop political resources in a
number of ways. Some examples include using lobbyists, undertaking large-scale mobilization
campaigns to cultivate public opinion, or working closely with leading legislators or powerful
policy entrepreneurs already favorably disposed to a group’s preferred policy outcome. When
groups possess legal resources they have the ability to access and deploy legal expertise capable
of recognizing the opportunities and constraints posed by laws, regulations, and the court system.
Technical resources are developed through the quality and amount of factual and scientific
evidence in support of a group’s position. These resources, or the ability to ‘access’ them even if
created by others, or by events and crises, is necessary if a group has any hope of successfully
achieving its goals.
Yet, simple possession and deployment of a particular form of resource does not always
equate with the fulfillment of a group’s policy goals since different venues are more or less
receptive to the type of resource possessed by a group (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 143).
For example, groups with strong legal resources have a natural affinity for the courts, while those
with strong political resources are likely to prefer legislative venues. Technical resource strength
often confers an advantage in administrative decision venues, yet is also a resource that is helpful
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for both political and court-based venues, especially in highly technical policy areas such as
human health and environmental harm.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Opponents’ resources
The emergent groups in our case studies, however, did not make choices over where to shop
based solely on their own resource strengths or weaknesses. Consideration is also given to the
mix and strength of opponents’ resources. This is because they know that the true strength of
their own group resources are not absolute, but rather are relative to opponents’ strengths as
applied to possible venues.

Venue accessibility
The degree of venue accessibility also matters to groups. Accessibility is a function of an
opponents’ degree of control over a venue and a venue’s image amiability or receptivity
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Groups make this calculation because the transaction costs
associated with venue choice vary with the degree of venue dominance by opponents and how
favorable a venue is to a group’s preferred image framing. Strong dominance by opponents and
low image amiability in a particular venue increase the transaction costs for those seeking policy
change because it increases the costs a group must devote to fulfill its goal of policy change,
while a weak presence by opponents and high image amiability necessarily lowers expected
transaction costs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).
The degree of opponent control or dominance of a venue is separate from a group’s
resource levels precisely because not all groups successfully translate a high level of resources
into a similar degree of venue dominance. In some cases the lack of success is simply due to
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group ineffectiveness. However, the nature of certain venues works against a strong correlation
between resource level and venue dominance because venue decision rules (e.g., courts and stare
decisis; administrative agencies and the role of administrative law) and structure (administrative
agencies and career bureaucrats) can and do mitigate the effects of high resource levels, no
matter how effectively they are applied.
A venue’s image receptivity, on the other hand, considers how different ‘frames’ of an
issue are perceived and received by the different legislative, judicial, administrative, and
collaborative venues. Groups often seek to define and frame public problems in ways that gain
the attention of, and therefore influence, the policymakers that matter in the various institutional
venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Stone 2001). As part of this, there is an ongoing and
critical interplay between image framing and a venue’s image receptivity. Successful political
actors are sensitive to this interplay and try to manipulate images to favor their preferred venue.
From an emergent group’s perspective, a venue’s image receptivity can and does have a
connection to the degree of dominance exercised by opponents over specific venues. For
example, if an opponent’s resources translate into strong dominance of a venue then it is
considered blocked, hence a poor venue to advance the emergent group’s interests and one in
which image receptivity is not a factor. Yet, if an opponent’s degree of control is weak or leaves
a venue contested (neutral), then image receptivity comes into play as a factor in venue choice.
In short, the Adaptive Venue Shopping (AVS) Framework posits that emergent groups, to
the best of their ability, strategically assess the institutional context and choose a policy venue
most favorable to the policy change they seek. Table 2 displays the AVS Framework in action as
applied to a group’s two easiest venue choices – the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ choices for achieving, or
not, a preferred policy outcome. The easy ‘best’ choice for an emergent group seeking to change
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policy is when the group possesses a high level of resources ‘matched’ to a venue, opponents
possess weak resource levels with respect to the same venue, opponents have weak control over
the venue, and the venue has a strong reputation for favoring the emergent group’s image of the
policy in question. Venues to be avoided—the easy ‘worst’ choice—display a mix of weak
emergent group resources with respect to the venue, strong opponent resources, strong
dominance of the venue by opponents, and low image receptivity (amiability).
Venue choices for new groups, of course, are not always easy because, as described in the
introduction, the deck is often stacked against them by entrenched, powerful opponents. This
means that emergent groups can, and do, make flawed venue choices despite their intention to
make the ‘best’ one. To anyone familiar with bounded rationality this is not surprising, but the
key to the Adaptive Venue Shopping Framework is what happens after such failed choices. The
field burning cases outlined below show that emergent groups learn and adapt by moving on to
another policy venue where they expect, and in these two cases, secure better results.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Research methodology
This study uses a multiple case study design to probe the question of venue choice. Multiple
case studies are appropriate when research questions require in-depth and contextual analysis,
and ask ‘why’ actors behave the way they do (Yin 2009). This study builds a synthetic
framework that identifies the variables that matter to groups as they are making venue choices.1
We chose to limit our analysis to the policy conflict over agricultural field burning in the Pacific
Northwest because it involved a similar environmental conflict that lasted over an appropriate

1

For more on the development of synthetic frameworks, see Cairney (2013)
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period of time in each of the states (more than ten years). Furthermore, our cases control for
ideology, culture, and geography because both policy conflicts occurred in the Inland Northwest
regions of Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho. This feature of our research design meets
Gerring’s (2001) description of similar cases and a most-similar research design where, ‘a few
cases…are as similar as possible in all respects except the outcome of interest, where [the cases]
are expected to vary’ (p. 210). Our data include personal interviews conducted with farmers,
representatives from the grass seed industry, personnel from administrative agencies, lawmakers,
journalists, advocacy groups, and attorneys. In all, we interviewed 35 individuals across the two
states through a snowball sampling method and also include archival data from local newspaper
accounts, public meeting records, and organizational newsletters. We turn now to our cases.
Agricultural field burning in the Inland Northwest
Lawns and golf courses around the world are planted and maintained with Kentucky Bluegrass
seed grown in eastern Washington State and northern Idaho. Since the 1940s, farmers in both
states have burned the plant’s post-harvest crop residue because they believe doing so ‘shocks’
plants into production, exposes the plant to more sunlight, and minimizes the growth of weeds.
The practice also minimizes labor costs and soil erosion because, without field burning, farmers
replant their fields every three to four years, compared to the six to eight years required for
burned fields.
Field burning also poses public health risks because minimizing the impact of smoke by
burning when favorable weather conditions permit is complicated by unpredictable wind patterns
that push smoke into the densely populated areas of Spokane, Washington and Coeur d’Alene,
Idaho. Efforts to regulate the practice by single jurisdictions tend not to work because smoke
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drifts across state and county lines, causing doctors to warn those with asthma, cystic fibrosis,
and other respiratory illnesses to stay indoors or leave during the field burning season that
extends from August through October. Finally, tourists and recreational enthusiasts avoid
visiting the region during the summer burning period, even though they are attracted to the
beautiful forests, rolling hills, streams and lakes, and abundant wildlife.
By the early 1990s, there was mounting pressure in both states for policy change as
public acceptance of relatively unrestricted field burning diminished. Environmentalists and
public health advocates in Idaho and Washington used this opportunity to pursue policy change,
and succeeded by instituting stronger burning restrictions that resulted in clearer skies. Yet the
same policy goals in these two states were pursued in different institutional venues, with Idaho
environmentalists twice choosing the judicial venue, while advocates in Washington opted for
collaboration before successfully pursuing a mixed venue strategy employing a local
administrative-legislative venue coupled with a state-level administrative venue.

Idaho field burning and venue choice: a judicial strategy
The public health risks associated with field burning in Idaho led to the formation of Safe Air for
Everyone (SAFE) in the late 1990s. SAFE began as a coalition of interests from the medical
community (i.e., Idaho Medical Association) and clean air advocates (i.e., the American Lung
Association), but later added support from the real estate industry and local Chambers of
Commerce due to concerns that field burning was impacting the local real estate and tourism
economy (Olsen and Hollander 1999). Despite SAFE’s modest beginnings, its membership grew
to 400 members by 2002 (Russell 2002). How did this emergent group approach its venue
shopping choices? The short answer is that they selected two venues across a span of roughly
12

five years (2002 to 2006), targeting each venue on the basis of their own resource strengths, their
opponents’ strengths, their opponent’s degree of control over different venues, and the expected
image receptivity of a venue.

Choosing the federal courts
Despite being a broad-based coalition, SAFE, 400-strong, was still quite small and unlikely to
wield much political clout relative to the rest of Idaho where concentration of population in and
around the southern city of Boise, the state capital, is concentrated. Grass growers, consisting of
about fifty individual farming operations, were also well organized through their professional
association, the North Idaho Farmer’s Association (NIFA). NIFA assessed ‘per-acre burning
fees’ which allowed the group to raise funds for continuously lobbying the legislative and
executive branches of Idaho government to protect farming practices from regulation. NIFA also
maintained close relationships with other extractive industries tied to agriculture, such as mining
and forestry interests. This alliance conferred a significant political advantage, especially in the
legislature, given that agriculture, mining, and forestry together dominate Idaho’s economy by
contributing $3.6 billion, or fourteen percent of GDP (Idaho Department of Labor 2009).
The political dominance of agricultural and other extractive industries explains why grass
growers were comfortable with a legislative strategy. In 1980, at the behest of the Idaho Farm
Bureau, Idaho passed one of the nation’s first and strongest right-to-farm laws that protected
agricultural practices from lawsuits (the law’s protections were enhanced more in 2003). The
dominance of the legislature by farmers and their allies also helps to explain the lax enforcement
of Idaho’s State Implementation Plan (SIP) for the federal Clean Air Act (CAA). Idaho’s SIP
was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1972. It limited field
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burning in all areas of agriculture because of recognized human health risks and handed
enforcement authority to the Idaho Air Quality Board. Yet, the legislature abolished the agency,
before reestablishing it in 1982, and renaming it as the Department of Environmental Quality,
with a caveat listing field burning as an allowable source of pollution under the CAA. The
legislature then repealed rules on agricultural burning in 1986 (Dukes 2007b, Idaho Department
of Environmental Quality 2008). Finally, in 1999 Idaho lawmakers passed legislation placing
regulatory jurisdiction over field burning in the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA), a
clientele agency designed to promote, not regulate, the agricultural industry.
In sum, the ability of SAFE’s opponents to dominate and effectively block access to the
state-based legislative and administrative venues, and the historical acceptance of an economic
growth ‘frame’ across both legislative and administrative institutions in Idaho (Powers and
Barrett 2001), signaled that a judicial venue offered SAFE the best bet for successfully pressing
its agenda (see top portion of Table 3). The executive director of SAFE expressed the
organization’s frustration about the likelihood of positive legislative action:
The Legislature has never really taken the lead on ensuring the public health, so we’ll continue to
work any and all avenues that we can in order to make sure that the Legislature understands the
public health crisis. We would prefer not to go to court, but in the absence of any clear leadership,
we most certainly will be prepared to take that step if we have to (Hedberg 2002).

Another interviewee put it more succinctly, ‘there was no legislative solution. The legislature
was part of the problem’ (Personal Interview, PHA).
Compared to SAFE’s limited political resources, the group’s access to legal resources
from outside groups and from public interest attorneys who volunteered their talents made legal
resources their strongest resource. This blend of factors led SAFE to choose the courts, but a
history of state judicial decisions that consistently favored economic interests and the state’s
clear right-to-farm laws prevented such suits from being filed in state courts. The federal courts,
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on the other hand, have established a decades-long track record of being receptive to a public
health framing when suits are filed under environmental laws like the CAA (Weber 1998). This
receptivity to SAFE’s preferred legal ‘framing’ of the battle over field burning was reinforced by
the fact that Idaho is under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a federal
appellate court with a reputation for handing down liberal rulings in the area of environmental
and human health hazards.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In February 2002, SAFE filed suit against Idaho growers under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. § 6901), which regulates the disposal of
hazardous waste. SAFE argued that crop residue constitutes a solid waste material that, when
burned, becomes hazardous and requires regulatory action by the EPA. The decision to file suit
under RCRA was a critical one for SAFE because, in doing so, they became committed to
pursuing their goals through the federal court system and generated new technical resources to
go along with their legal resources. To this end, their strategy included recruiting
[e]xpert witnesses [who] were retained to demonstrate that grass residue met the legal definition of
agricultural waste as defined by RCRA; that the smoke which was making people ill was in fact
originating from grower’s [sic] fields, and that the high particulate readings on air quality monitors
were correlated with symptoms seen in the general public complaint records (SAFE 2002).

After three days of oral arguments before the Federal District Court in Boise, ID, SAFE’s suit
was dismissed after the judge ruled that burned crop residue did not meet the definition of
hazardous waste. According to the judge, ‘The Court finds the burning of residue is not a
“disposal” and, further, the residue is not a “solid waste” because it is neither discarded or [sic]
abandoned, but instead, used as part of the growth process. Therefore RCRA does not apply’
(Alkire 2002).
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Doubling down on the federal courts
Despite the judge’s decision in the case, SAFE was emboldened to continue seeking a
legal victory through the federal court system and did so again in 2006 (see lower portion of
Table 3), but the organization remained active at the state level as well. In the meantime, it
maintained its core group of members by playing defense as best it could in the state-based
legislative and administrative venues, while also supporting efforts to improve the quantity and
quality of the scientific information they were collecting. In fact, despite losing the RCRA court
case, SAFE continued using the scientific resources generated from its activities in the judicial
venue. The case ‘created a public record – a very undisputed record – about how this practice
harms people. [We] still couldn’t find a legal angle to stop this practice but it was sort of this
moving train about here’s how harmful the [field burning] is’ (Personal Interview, ATY).
In addition, the case strengthened SAFE’s legal resources by creating new professional
relationships with other attorneys involved in federal public health and environmental litigation.
During SAFE’s appeal of the RCRA decision to the Ninth Circuit, the group developed
relationships with Sierra Club’s legal organization, Earthjustice. Their interactions with these
attorneys led to the discovery of a fatal flaw in Idaho’s SIP that led to the maintenance of a
court-based strategy, policy change, and thus, the fulfillment of SAFE’s policy goals.
While examining Idaho’s SIP, the group found Idaho did not articulate field burning as
an allowable source of air pollution (Smith 2005). SAFE then notified state officials within the
ISDA of the omission and that it was prepared to litigate the issue in federal court. Opponents of
SAFE—the pro-field burning interests—acted to preempt the lawsuit by passing legislation
amending the SIP during the 2005 legislative session. The amendment specifically recognized
field burning as an allowable form of pollution under the CAA, a revision that EPA approved
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that year. Members of SAFE protested the move by ‘the farm-lobby-legislature’ and the fact that
‘EPA rubber stamped it’ (Personal Interview, PHA) because, from their perspective, EPA failed
to assess the public health impacts of field burning prior to accepting the change in the SIP.
EPA’s response was that, in approving the amended SIP, it was clarifying what had already been
existing practice in Idaho (Geranios 2005). SAFE appealed this decision, arguing that the EPA
violated the Administrative Procedures Act by not considering the public health consequences of
approving the practice of field burning (Smith 2005).
After SAFE appealed the EPA’s decision, the case immediately came before the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Interpreting the plain meaning of Idaho’s SIP, the three judge panel
agreed that EPA’s approval of the SIP was ‘arbitrary and capricious.’ The court thus ordered the
EPA to reconsider its approval of field burning and required Idaho to conduct a comprehensive
analysis of field burning’s impact throughout the state (Dukes 2007a). In response to the
decision, and with farmers and lawmakers growing weary of continued litigation over field
burning, Idaho Governor Butch Otter (R-ID) supported the idea of the ISDA spearheading a
compromise between SAFE and the growing community to resolve the persistent problem of
field burning. By January 2008, a tentative agreement between farmers and public health interest
culminated in a new smoke management program transferring regulatory jurisdiction over field
burning to the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, an agency designed to improve air
quality and with power to declare air quality emergencies (Buley and Stewart 2008, Hedberg
2008). The negotiated agreement, which required final approval from the Idaho State
Legislature, then passed the legislature unanimously and was signed by Governor Otter in March
2008.
Washington Field Burning and Venue Choice: A Multi-Venue Strategy
17

In 1998, the State of Washington, through its Department of Ecology (DOE), became the first
state to ban the burning of bluegrass. Most field burning occurred in eastern Washington near
the city of Spokane, which was within five miles of the northern Idaho region described in the
previous case study. This case explains how Washington arrived at their field burning ban and
describes the multiple venue choices made by clean air advocates along the way to their final
success. In short, after analyzing the institutional context--their own in-group resources,
opponents’ resource strengths and their dominance of particular venues, and venues’ receptivity
to their ‘framing’ of the problem—clean air advocates in Washington moved in a decidedly
different direction than SAFE did in Idaho. Instead of the courts, they initially chose a
collaborative decision-making arrangement (see top of Table 4). But finding no success there,
and with the advent of a better organized advocacy group called Save Our Summers (SOS), clean
air advocates shifted strategy and successfully sought policy change through both a local, mixed
administrative-legislative (elected board) venue and a state-level administrative venue (see
bottom of Table 4).
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

A tough setting leads to a collaborative venue
Jurisdiction over air pollution in Washington State rests with the Department of Ecology. In
order to tailor regulatory policy to local jurisdictions, the state’s1967 Clean Air Act grants
concurrent regulatory authority to county-based boards such as the Spokane County Air
Pollution Control Authority (SCAPCA).2 SCAPCA’s five appointed members are selected by
the County Commission, two cities (Spokane, City of Spokane Valley), several smaller cities in
the County, and one at-large member from the community. The inherently conservative nature
2

SCAPCA was later renamed Spokane Clean Air.
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of Spokane County politics allowed farmers to focus their efforts on influencing the selection of
board members sympathetic toward agricultural practices. To advance these efforts, growers
formed the Intermountain Grass Growers Association (IGGA) in the 1960s to monitor SCAPCA
activities and to regulate field burning only minimally. While some citizens attended meetings
to complain about air quality in those early days, they were unorganized and not able to compete
with the influence of IGGA.
By 1987, Spokane violated federal CAA standards governing small particulate matter, so
DOE and SCAPCA began assessing the inventory of practices contributing to poor air quality.
Without widespread public support and in the absence of any advocacy groups to support its
effort, SCAPCA proposed new regulations in 1990 that reduced the ‘burning season’ and the
numbers of acres to be burned from roughly 31,000 in 1990 to 18,108 in 2000. Over 200
members of the grass growing community arrived at the public hearings to oppose the new rules
(Bayne 1990), outnumbering the handful of citizens testifying in favor of stricter controls
(Sullivan 1990). In the end, IGGA and pro-field burning interests succeeded in watering down
the new rules by increasing the 1990 baseline to 35,000 acres and allowing field burning to
continue into the indefinite future without any reduction in acreage (versus a phase-out) (Yates
1990, Spokane County Air Pollution Control Authority 1990).
Opposition toward the practice of field burning escalated when it became evident that
little was being done to regulate the practice, causing a group of loosely organized stakeholders,
led by the American Lung Association, to begin addressing the problem through a collaborative
institution. Advocates for cleaner air recognized that the ‘clean air’ frame they were trying to
advance could not compete in regulatory agencies with the grass growers’ claim, supported by
strong technical resources and classical economic theory, that regulatory limits on field burning
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guaranteed the economic demise of the grass seed industry. The general lack of resources,
whether legal, technical or political, within the nascent clean air coalition led its members to
embrace the collaborative possibility as perhaps their best, if not only, chance to achieve their
agenda of less field burning and cleaner air.
Coupled with their resource calculation, clean air advocates knew that, by definition, a
collaborative institutional forum gave them a fighting chance because its primary purpose was to
produce win-win outcomes in which all stakeholders are made better off than before.
Additionally, stakeholders besides clean air advocates began noticing the negative effects of field
burning in the region. One was the Soil and Water Conservation Society (SWCS), which
produced a position statement explaining how ‘[c]onflicting interests have become so polarized
and emotion-charged that it may be very difficult to achieve a rational solution,’ while also
calling for the ‘effective resolution of conflicts and resource use problems arising from this
issue’ (Soil and Water Conservation Society 1990, p. 2). Shortly afterward, the Spokane
Chamber of Commerce declared ‘the need to preserve and improve air quality in the Inland
Northwest’ (Spokane Chamber of Commerce No Date). The chamber recognized that ‘the grass
seed industry is an important economic force in the regions [sic] economy’ (Spokane Chamber of
Commerce [No Date]), but nevertheless joined with clean air advocates to participate in the
Inland Northwest Field Burning Summit between 1990-1995. Other Washington State interests
included farmers and seed processing companies who used the summit to show how the industry
already had in place voluntary regulations through IGGA. On the public health side, the loose
coalition of tourism interests, the American Lung Association, the medical community,
SCAPCA, and the Washington State Department of Ecology participated in hopes of breaking
the policy gridlock over field burning.
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Although the primary purpose of the collaborative summit was for stakeholders to find
alternative ways to reduce or eliminate the impact of smoke from field burning altogether, almost
no progress was made toward resolving the field burning problem during its five year existence.
In 1994, the American Lung Association announced its withdrawal from the summit, expressing
frustration that the collaborative process was making little progress toward reducing the impact
of smoke (American Lung Association 1994). When SCAPCA hired a new Executive Director
who was committed to stricter controls over field burning, growers also announced plans to
withdraw from the summit. The dissolution of the Inland Northwest Field Burning Summit
summit became official when, in 1995, farmers secretly and successfully convinced Washington
state legislators to pass a law weakening SCAPCA’s ability to pass regulations affecting
growers.
The unanimous passage of Senate Bill 5609 in both the Washington House and Senate
was a moment that forever changed field burning politics in Washington State. The bill
preserved SCAPCA’s authority to regulate the number of acres burned, but the agency was no
longer able to set burning seasons nor could it ban burning on weekends and holidays. In short,
farmers were still required to respect limits on how many acres they burned, but they could burn
whenever they wanted, and this meant more days with smoke in the air (Camden 1995).

Strategic adaptation: a simultaneous two venue strategy
The decision by growers to weaken SCAPCA’s authority caused an organized public backlash
against field burning, which led to clean air advocates formally establishing the citizens’ group
known as Save Our Summers in May 1995. Their mission was to eliminate field burning and
thereby create ‘a beautiful and healthy place for all of us to breathe and raise our children’ (Save
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Our Summers 1996). SOS grew quickly and chose a two-pronged strategy for pressing its fight
against field burning.
SOS started where it was strongest. With a group of politically mobilized citizens at the
local level, SOS gravitated toward the increasingly contested and accessible SCAPCA, which
was regulatory in character. Whatever dominance growers still exercised over the board was
further diminished as complaints to the air pollution control hotline increased (278 complaints
were registered in 1995), and large numbers of citizens against field burning, often 80 to 90
percent of the audience, started dominating SCAPCA meetings (Steele 1995). Finally, in 1995,
SCAPCA added a new board member who was publicly opposed to field burning and
sympathetic to the public health claims emphasized by SOS (Steele 1995).
SOS also began generating technical resources. They did so by gathering medical data
and developing relationships with Spokane’s medical community, including the American Lung
Association. These new allies brought the power of expertise to bear on behalf of SOS because
many doctors ‘believed that the medical information - the scientific information - showed that the
smoke was a hazard…. [A] survey [of] the entire society of physicians [in Spokane asked] …
whether grass burning smoke was a health problem. Out of the 600 members, 580 responded,
yes, it was’ (McLeod 2005). With the medical community’s help, in late 1995 SOS succeeded in
convincing the local-administrative board to vote 3-2 to institute a field burning phase-out in
Spokane County over a seven-year period. Since this new local rule focused on field burning
acreage only, it fit within the state-based law passed earlier in 1995 by the Washington
legislature (the law weakened SCAPCA’s ability to tell farmers when they could burn, but did
not rule out elimination of the practice).
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Yet, while SOS was pursuing change through SCAPCA it was concurrently seeking to
convince the state-level DOE to ban field burning because the problem was not confined to
Spokane County, and the agency had the power to end the practice statewide. Given DOE’s
overarching regulatory jurisdiction over field burning in the state of Washington, and the fact
that SCAPCA had been dominated through the years by growers, the strategy made sense.
SOS’s technical resources, generated from its relationships with the medical community and
American Lung Association, matched well with the agency’s professionally trained staff, who
were fluent in the science behind environmental and public health problems and sympathetic to a
‘public health’ framing of the problem. The Clinton Administration’s emphasis on rewriting
rules for small particulate matter generated even more convincing evidence that SOS was able to
mobilize before the environmental agency, particularly the series of Harvard-based
epidemiological studies linking mortality with exposure to small particulate matter (Schwartz, et
al. 1996, Personal Interview, SR). SOS also knew that, in addition to having the right resources
to bring before an agency, it also needed an agency that was receptive to its preferred framing of
the problem. SOS considered that, of all the agencies responsible for regulating environmental
issues, DOE was the agency most sympathetic to its ‘public health’ framing of the problem and
the one most likely to act in favor of public health benefits when weighed against the economic
costs of pursuing them (Personal Interview, PHA).
After SOS successfully convinced SCAPCA to support an end to field burning in 1995,
growers responded by asking the DOE to overturn the decision by writing statewide rules
governing the practice of field burning (Steele 1996a). Their efforts were rebuked by DOE
personnel, many of whom were involved with the Inland Field Burning Summit and had
concluded that farmers acted in bad faith by no longer working through the collaborative process
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when they went before the legislature to alter SCAPCA’s regulatory powers. Furthermore, the
scientific evidence linking fine particulate matter to mortality was becoming impossible for DOE
personnel to ignore (Personal Interview, SR); DOE expressed support for SCAPCA’s decision to
phase out field burning and issued a directive that formally supported the decision (Steele
1996b). One DOE official noted that ‘the research on the health effects of particulate matter was
instrumental, so as we got better science about what the consequences were, that just added
momentum and courage to … agency [decision-makers when it came] … to mak[ing] this
difficult choice. It didn’t hurt that some of that research was conducted very close to home at the
University of Washington and Washington State University’ (Personal Interview, SR).
The battle in Washington over field burning ended after DOE funded a study that was
completed by Washington State University economists concluding that the public health costs of
the practice outweighed its economic benefits (Washington Department of Ecology 1997). With
persuasive evidence supporting its decision to act affirmatively, the DOE ended the burning of
Kentucky Bluegrass completely in 1998.

Discussion and conclusion
The policy battles that occurred over the problem of field burning in Washington and Idaho
illustrate how emergent groups view, react, learn, and adapt to the larger institutional context
when shopping for a policymaking venue most conducive to their overall policy goals. While we
are confident in our results, the findings at this point are suggestive and necessarily stand as
testable hypotheses since they are derived from multiple case studies. To establish a more
definitive interpretation of such results, we encourage scholars to consider additional testing
through a larger series of venue shopping cases involving more than a single policy area or
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controversy. While our insights support many individual aspects of existing approaches to venue
shopping, the key theoretical lesson is that a synthetic approach, which we call the Adaptive
Venue Shopping (AVS) Framework, is better able to capture the complexity of choice facing
emergent groups in a multi-venue ecology of games that can and does change over time given
the capacity of groups to learn and adapt their venue choice strategies.
The practical takeaway, for its part, should be encouraging to newly formed advocacy
groups seeking change in environmental policy and other policies too. This is because, despite
the resource limitations that are almost always part of the equation for new groups, the AVS
Framework communicates a method for analyzing the larger institutional context, identifying
venues vulnerable to policy change, and then crafting an effective venue choice approach based
on that analysis. At the same time, the AVS Framework recognizes that just because initial
venue choices, no matter how rational they appeared at the time, do not result in the desired
policy change, the learning, adaptation, cumulative resources, and new allies that come from
these early venue battles can point the way toward other venue choices likely to be even more
amenable to policy change.
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Table 1: The Logic of Venue Choice
Degree of Venue Accessibility
Decision Venue

Strength of
Group
Resources

Opponents’
Resources

Opponents’
Degree of
Dominance

Venue Image
Receptivity

Courts

Low to High

Low to High

Weak,
Neutral/Contested
or Strong

Low to High

Administrative
Agencies

Low to High

Low to High

Weak,
Neutral/Contested
or Strong

Low to High

Legislature

Low to High

Low to High

Weak,
Neutral/Contested
or Strong

Low to High

Collaborative
Institution

Low to High

Low to High

Weak,
Neutral/Contested
or Strong

Low to High
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Table 2: The Logic of Venue Choice – Easy Choices
Degree of Venue Accessibility
Decision Venue

Strength of
Group
Resources

Opponents’
Resources

Opponents’ Degree
of Dominance

Venue Image
Receptivity

Easy “best”
Choice

High

Low

Weak

High

Easy “worst”
Choice

Low

High

Strong

Low
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Table 3: Venue Choices in Idaho
Decision Venue

Group
Resources

Opponent
Resources

Accessibility/Opponent Venue
Dominance

Accessibility/Venue
Image Receptivity

Choosing the Federal Courts using RCRA
Courts (federal)
State
Legislature
Administrative
Agency

High
(strongest)
Low/Limited

High

Neutral

High

Strong

High
(relative to others)
Low

Low/Limited

High

Strong

Low

Choosing the Federal Courts using the Clean Air Act and Administrative Procedures Act
Courts
(federal)

High

High

Neutral

High
(relative to others)

State
Legislature

Low

High

Strong

Low

Administrative
Agency

Medium-High
(getting
stronger)

High

Strong

Low
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Table 4: The Washington Case: Clean Air Advocates, Collaboration, and a Two Venue Adaptation Strategy
Decision Venue

Group
Resources

Opponent
Resources

Accessibility/Opponent Venue
Dominance

Accessibility/Venue
Image Receptivity

Choosing Collaboration
Courts (federal)

Low

High

Neutral

High

State Admin
Agency (DOE)

Low

Medium

Neutral

Medium-High

Administrative
Legislative
(SCAPCA)

Low

High

Strong

Low-Medium

State
Legislature

Low

Medium

Strong

Medium

Collaborative
Institution
(INFB Summit)

Medium

Medium

Neutral/Contested

High

Choosing both the Local Administrative-Legislative and State Administrative Agency
Courts
(federal)

Low

High

Neutral

High

State
Administrative
Agency (DOE)

Medium-High

Medium

Neutral

Medium-High

AdministrativeLegislative
(SCAPCA)

Medium-High
(and growing)

High

Neutral/Contested

Medium
(moving to High)

State
Legislature

Low

High

Strong

Low
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